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Rank Dependent Utility, Tax Evasion 





In the simple Allingham-Sandmo portfolio model of tax evasion an expected utility 
maximizer will cheat more than what is estimated in empirical studies. Two main types of 
explanation have been suggested as solutions to this puzzle: (1) Tax payers act according to 
some non-expected utility theory, and (2) Individual ethical norms and social stigma induce 
people not to cheat. In the present study we test two hypotheses within these broad 
explanations: (1) Tax payers are weighting subjective probabilities of being penalised 
according to the rank dependent utility theory, and (2) Tax payers’ beliefs about social norms 
have an effect on their decision to evade taxes. Our model is characterized by a simultaneous 
determination of tax evasion and labour supply, including the effect on tax payers of a social 
norm of not cheating. Using Norwegian survey data our hypotheses are corroborated. Our 
estimates imply that if the objective probability of being penalized is, say 3 %, the weighted 
probability is about 23 %. Our study provides an independent confirmation of the rank 
dependent expected utility theory. The model explains data 53% better than pure random 
choices and predicts hours worked in the regular economy, among tax evaders as well non tax 
evaders, rather precisely. The model is an example of a two sector choice model and the 
results indicate that an overall wage increase may shift labor supply away from the irregular 
part of the economy towards the regular. 
JEL-Code: C25, D12, D81, H26, J22. 
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1. Introduction 
 
In the literature of tax evasion it has been considered a puzzle that people seem to cheat 
less than suggested by the expected utility theory. According to Allingham and Sandmo’s 
(1972) portfolio choice approach to income tax evasion, a risk-averse tax payer, with a 
von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function, will under-report his income whenever the 
tax rate is greater than the expected penalty rate. Intuition as well as empirical evidence 
seems to contradict this conclusion. For the more common types of tax evasion the 
sanctions in many countries consist of fines less (or not much higher) than the amount 
evaded, whereas the probabilities of tax returns being audited are of the order of a few 
percent.
5  In general, expected utility maximizers would, therefore, be tax evaders, a 
result that is not supported by empirical evidence.
6  
One reason for the discrepancy might be that the tax payers’ subjective probability 
of audit is considerably higher than the observed objective probability.
7 A related 
explanation is that people are weighting objective or subjective probabilities of sanctions. 
Another reason might be social norms producing shame and stigma. Our empirical study 
includes tests of these two. A third reason is lack of time and opportunities to work in the 
irregular part of the economy. 
Although a number of models allow for weighting of probabilities, a phenomenon 
observed in many laboratory experiments, models based on simple weighting of 
probabilities violate stochastic dominance. In the RDEU model, initially developed by 
                                                 
5 Tax authorities are somewhat reluctant to supply information about the (low) values of probabilities of 
being audited and sanctioned. According to Marchese and Privileggi (1997), p. 400) the audit rate in Italy 
in 1991 and 1994 was about 1 per cent. In the US the audit rate decreased from 4.75 per cent in 1965 to 0.8 
per cent in 1990, and increased to 1.9 per cent in 1995 (Feinstein 1998, p. 576) The penalty rate in the US 
is about 50 per cent of the tax evaded. Thus, in the early 1990ies, the expected value per dollar of evaded 
tax was almost equal to 0.99 dollar. 
6 See the review of Andreoni et al. (1998) for references and discussion. For any sensible value of the risk 
aversion parameter taxpayers should report either a small proportion of their income or none whatsoever 
(Feinstein 1999, p. 576). In spite of the apparent profitability of tax evasion, the comprehensive Taxpayer 
Compliance Measurement Program in the US found that about 40 per cent of the tax payers underpaid their 
taxes (Feinstein 1998, F361). Various studies of the underground economy conclude that in Western 
countries somewhere between 2 and 30 per cent of the BNP is not reported to the tax authorities. 
(Schneider and Enste 2000). Note that some authors report the income evaded and others the tax evaded, cf 
note 5. The difference is related to the difference between the model of Allingham and Sandmo (1972) and 
that of Yitzhaky (1974). 
7 This discrepancy is documented in a Slemrod’s (1992) comprehensive survey of experimental and 
empirical literature on tax evasion. m:\o\Frisch Sd\RDU, evasion, FA rev2   3 
Quiggin (1982), the linearity of probabilities of the EU model is replaced by a probability 
weighting function which assigns weights to the probabilities of the different states of 
nature. The weights themselves are functions of the rank of a given state of nature, where 
the rank is determined by the individual level of satisfaction obtained in the various 
states. Since in the RDEU model it is the cumulative distribution function that is 
transformed, stochastic dominance is assured (Quiggin 1982). The cumulative prospect 
theory of Tversky and Kahneman (1992) has also this property, and that model has the 
additional property of allowing for different weighting functions for losses and for gains, 
a property that has some attraction in studies of tax evasion. Perhaps less attractive in a 
study of tax evasion is the assumption in the cumulative prospect theory that only 
changes in wealth, and not its absolute value, matters.  
  The RDEU model is among the strongest contenders to the EU model (see e.g. 
Weber and Kirsner (1997)). Examining a number of empirical studies, Hey and Orme 
(1994) concludes that among a great number of utility functionals the RDEU function is 
found to be the best.
8 Empirical support for the RDEU model has been obtained by Lopes 
(1987, 1990), Cho, Luce, and von Winterfeldt (1994), and Chung, von Winterfeldt, and 
Luce (1994).
 9   
A number of studies indicate that the weighting function in the RDEU model has 
the form of an inverted S-shaped curve. Empirical support for this shape is found i.a. in 
several choice studies.
10 A particular reason for employing the RDEU model is the 
theoretical study by Arcand and Rota Graziosi (2005) demonstrating that the RDEU 
model provides a compelling answer to the above mentioned puzzle of over-
                                                 
8 Hey and Orme (1994, p. 1321) conclude their examination thus: “Expected utility theory (and its special 
case, risk neutrality) emerges from this analysis fairly intact. For possibly 39 % of the subjects … EU 
theory appears to fit no worse than any of the other models … For other 67 % of the subjects, one or more 
of the eight “top-level” functionals … fits significantly better in statistical terms, though often the 
economic significance is not all that great. Of the eight “top level” functionals it would appear that the two 
rank dependent functionals and the quadratic utility model emerge as the strongest contenders (with the 
Quiggin weighting functional having a models lead over its power weighting function rival)”. 
9 See, however, discussions in Wakker et al. (1994), and Birnbaum et al. (1999) of various weaknesses of 
the RDEU model. 
10 “Empirical support for this specification comes from a wide range of studies. …Collectively, these 
studies show that models with s-shaped probability transformations offer significant predictive 
improvement over EUT and outperform other rivals.” Starmer (2000, p. 359).  For examples, see Camerer 
and Ho (1994), Tversky and Kahneman (1992), Wu and Gonzales (1996), Gonzales and Wu (1999), and, 
for a survey, Camerer (1995). m:\o\Frisch Sd\RDU, evasion, FA rev2   4 
compliance.
11 The weight a person gives to the uncertainty of events may for several 
reasons differ from the objective probabilities. People may (i) form (deterministic) 
subjective probabilities, (ii) weigh objective probabilities, (iii) weigh subjective 
probabilities, or (iv), weigh probabilities due to ambiguity or uncertainty about subjective 
or objective probabilities. The present empirical study is based on subjective 
probabilities. The estimate of the parameter a below indicates that people transform these 
subjective probabilities. The study cannot, however, distinguish between a weighting of 
given subjective probabilities and a weighting caused by the uncertainty or vagueness of 
the objective probabilities. In studies of ambiguity, i.e. in studies where objective 
probabilities are absent, Gilboa (1987) and Schmeidler (1989) have (seemingly 
independently) come up with the RDEU model. In these studies, the decision weights are 
interpreted as non-additive subjective probabilities. In the standard RDEU model 
developed by Quiggin (1993) objective probabilities are assumed known. These 
probabilities are then transformed by non-additive decision weights.  
1213 
In recent years a growing number of studies have suggested that tax compliance 
depends on individual and social norms, and also that individual norms are influenced by 
social norms.
14. By social norms are usually meant moral standards attributed to a social 
group or collective (Wenzel, 2004). Some authors rather emphasize the effect of social 
customs. There might be several reasons for a tendency to internalize social norms of tax 
compliance. One reason might be that people have a general wish of behaving according 
to society’s rules, a conformity attitude. Tax law should be adhered to even if one 
disagrees with the specific rules (Henrich 2004). Another reason might be that people 
consider it right to act equally (ir)responibly as their fellow citizens, a reciprocity attitude 
(Rabin, 1998, and Falk and Fehr, 2002). Behavior will then be characterized by 
                                                 
11 Dhami and al-Nowaihi (2007) demonstrates that the cumulative prospect theory of Tversky and 
Kahneman (1992) provides a satisfactory account of tax evasion, including an explanation of the Yitzhaki 
puzzle, than expected utility theory 
12 It is worth noticing that Allais in his 1953 article comes up with the RDEU model. Discussing the 
independent works of Quiggin (1982), Yaari (1987), and Segal (1987), he states in his Nobel prize lecture 
in 1988: “It is very significant that, starting from entirely different premises, all three authors have been led 
to a mathematical formulation that is analogous to my own”. 
 
13 Some attempts to model this distinction appear in Fox and Tversky (1998), and Wu and Gonzales (1999). 
Kilka and Weber (2001) provide estimates of both probability judgements and probability transformations. 
14 Of course, the idea that individual norms of tax evasion might be influenced by social norms is not new, 
see e.g. Kelman (1958). m:\o\Frisch Sd\RDU, evasion, FA rev2   5 
conditional cooperation (Frey and Torgler 2007). People will tend to comply only to the 
extent that other people comply.  
Breaching ones’ own individual norms might cause guilt, whereas breaching a 
social norm or custom might produce shame and stigma. Guilt and shame might produce 
“psychic costs” (Gordon 1989), and stigma might produce more direct costs reducing the 
utility of the tax payer. Several empirical studies corroborate these ideas. In their classical 
field experiment Schwartz and Orleans (1967) found that tax payers who were remined 
that compliance is a moral duty reduced evasion more than those who were informed that 
evasion might be sanctioned. Grasmick and Scott (1982) concluded that guilt had a 
stronger effect than stigma and legal punishment. A number of more recent studies 
indicate that internalized norms increase tax compliance (e.g. Hasseldine and Kaplan, 
1992; Erhard and Feinstein, 1994; Reckers, Sanders and Roark, 1994).  
In the social custom literature it is usually assumed that a person obtains utility by 
behaving in accordance with a social custom, a utility that is lost if tax evasion (of any 
amount)  is undertaken. In addition, as Myles and Naylor (1996) assume, there is a 
conformity payoff that depends on the size of the conforming population. 
It is not our purpose to distinguish between these various explanations of why 
social norms or customs might have an effect on the behavior of tax payers. Our goal is to 
carry out a simultaneous test of the deterrence hypothesis of an RDEU model of tax 
compliance (Bernasconi 1998, Eide 2003) and the hypothesis that an individual tax payer 
is influenced by his or her assessment of the social norm of tax compliance.  
 Our results indicate that people are exaggerating the probability of being 
sanctioned for tax evasion. In addition, they are overweighing this probability, possibly 
because of the uncertainty or ambiguity of the subjective (and objective) probability. We 
also find that tax evasion depends on individual tax payers’ assessment of the social norm 
of tax compliance. Thus, stigma and overweighting of probabilities might explain the 
“tax evasion puzzle”.
15 
We also allow for rational behavior in the form of utility maximization under budget 
constraints, together with random elements, to play a role in explaining labor supply 
                                                 
15 Using various parameter estimates from other studies, Dhami and al-Nowaihi (2007) show that the “tax 
evasion puzzle” can be explained within a prospect theory framework. m:\o\Frisch Sd\RDU, evasion, FA rev2   6 
when tax evasion is an option. It is left to the data to determine the importance of the 
different elements. In this respect we deviate from the approach to economic research 
hinted at in Elster (1989) where it seems that norms are alternatives to rational choice 
behavior rather than a supplement. 
The empirical results imply that economic incentives matter with respect to the 
labor supply when working in the shadow economy is an option. The model explains data 
53% better than if all choices had been made at pure random.  
The labor supply elasticities imply that an overall wage increase may shift labor 
supply away from the irregular economy towards the regular economy.  This also means 
that when there is a negative shock that hits employment and wages, labor supply may 
increase in the irregular part of the economy. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model. A labour supply 
model permitting people to evade tax or to be honest is estimated by use of data from a 
survey carried out by a Norwegian polling institute. In a first stage, a person is assumed 
to choose to be an evader or not. In a second stage, the person will decide on the number 
of working hours, given the decision of evading taxes or not. It should be noted that we 
employ a random utility framework. The reason why is that we do not observe all 
attributes of a choice that affect preferences. Hence our dependent variables will not be 
deterministic variables like hours of work, but probabilities of being a tax evader or not, 
and the probability of working certain hours. Our model is an example of a two sector 
choice model and to our knowledge this is the first attempt to analyse tax evasion based 
on a structural econometric model approach.  
 Sections 3 and 4 give the data and estimation results, respectively. Section 5 
report labor supply elasticities and Section 6 concludes. m:\o\Frisch Sd\RDU, evasion, FA rev2   7 
 




The purpose of our analysis is to estimate a labor supply model when tax evasion is an 
option. This implies that we are able to tests hypotheses with regards to how labor supply 
respond to changes in wages, exogenous income and tax rates. In our model we are able 
to present labor supply responses when tax evasion is an observed option. In this way we 
are able to control for something that otherwise is ignored when labor supply models are 
estimated. What otherwise has to be treated as unobserved heterogeneity in the choice 
sets are here included in the model.  The model is an example of a two sector choice 
model where the two sectors are the regular and the irregular part of the economy. 
We will assume that the individual decides in two stages. In the first stage he or 
she decides whether to be honest (H) or to be a tax evader (E). We will assume that the 
individual chooses the strategy that gives him, or her, the highest utility.  
Tax evasion is a risky activity. There is a probability that a tax evader will be 
caught if taxes are evaded and we thus assume that the individual makes his or her tax 
evasion decision under uncertainty. As mentioned in the introduction we extend  the 
approach of Allingham and Sandmo (1972) by allowing for the possibility that the 
individual deviates from the expected utility behavior by giving overweight to small 
probabilities that are related to undesirable events, see Kahneman and Tversky (1979). 
In the second decision stage, the individual decides on how many hours to work, 
given the strategy of being honest or not. If he or she follows an evasion strategy, part of 
the wage income is not declared to the authorities. A tax evader may in part earn wage 
income that is declared to the tax authorities and in part wage income that is not declared. 
Thus, an individual who follows the evasion strategy may work in the regular as well as 
in the irregular part of the economy. A person following an honest strategy works of 
course only in the regular part of the economy.  
There have been previous attempts to estimate tax evasion models based on micro 
data. In Lacroix and Fortin (1992) a quadratic utility function is applied together with m:\o\Frisch Sd\RDU, evasion, FA rev2   8 
budget constraints to generate labor supply functions for the regular and the irregular 
labor market. Agents are assumed to decide under uncertainty, given probabilities for 
being caught and fines if detected. The model is made stochastic by assuming that one of 
the parameter in the utility function is random. Labor supply functions are derived from 
applying a marginal criteria approach. The model is estimated on Canadian survey data. 
Lemieux, Fortin and Frechette (1994) apply the same data set to estimate a similar 
labor supply model. Labor supply in the regular and irregular part of the economy is 
estimated, including the participation rate in tax evading activities. The utility function is 
assumed to be quasi-linear and separable in consumption and leisure. The model is made 
random by assuming that a parameter in the budget constraint is random. Again, labor 
supply functions are derived from applying a marginal criteria approach.  
In contrast to the two previous contributions we assume a random utility model with 
extreme value distributed utilities. The specification of the deterministic part of the utility 
function is a Box-Cox transformation of consumption and leisure. This specification 
allows us to check whether the estimated utility function is quasi-concave for all 
individuals, which is not so easily done with polynomial forms. The Box-Cox utility 
function is rather flexible with linear and log-linear utility functions as special cases. 
Moreover, our specification of the budget constraints takes into account all details of the 
tax structure. The marginal tax rates are not uniformly increasing with income (Appendix 
2) and hence, the budget set is non-convex. The latter implies that marginal criteria 
cannot be applied to generate labor supply decisions and in our model the agents are 
assumed to compare utilities across all alternatives when making their decisions. 
Moreover, because all details of the tax functions are accounted for, we are able to use 
the model, once estimated, to simulate the outcome of different tax structures. Finally, 
and in contrast to the previous work in this field, we allow for a weighting of the 
detection probability and we let perception of social norms play a role in explaining 
behavior. 
  Our model is a random utility model and with choice probabilities as the outcome of 
the model. These probabilities are input in the joint likelihood that gives the ex-ante joint 
probability of the observed choices made by the individuals in the sample. By 
maximizing this joint likelihood with respect to the unobserved parameters of the sample m:\o\Frisch Sd\RDU, evasion, FA rev2   9 
we let the observed choices has the highest chance to occur (maximum likelihood 
estimation). The theoretical model is the same as the empirical model and is an example 
of structural econometric modeling.    
 
2.2 A two stage model. 
To explain the model we start with the last decision stage, stage2. Here we model 
the choices, given the decision of the individual to be an evader or not. 
Stage2. Given an honest strategy 
Let  
CiH = after tax wage income when the individual follows an honest strategy (H) and hiH  =  
annual hours; i=1,2,,,n, where n is the number of categories of hours. When i=1, the 
individual does not work. 
Let 
WH= hourly wage rate in the regular economy 
RiH=gross annual wage income=WHhiH 
I=non-wage income 
T(RiH,I)=taxes paid as a step-wise linear function of wage income and non-wage income. 
Thus 
 
iH iH iH ( 1 ) C R I T(R ,I) ;i 1 ,2,,,n     
 
Let UiH be the utility when the individual follows an honest strategy and works hiH 
hours and let X be a vector of socio-demographic characteristics. Moreover, iH is a 




iH iH iH i (2) U u(C ,h ,X) ;i 1,2,,,n     
 m:\o\Frisch Sd\RDU, evasion, FA rev2   10 
u(.) is the deterministic part of the utility function and i is the random part. The random 
part may be known to the individual but not to the outside observer. The total utility, the 
sum of the random and the deterministic part, is an ordinal utility function.  
Let SH denote the expected value of the max of the utility function. As 
demonstrated in Ben-Akiva and Lerman (1985), SH is given by 
n
H 22 i1 , 2 , , , n i H k H
k1
(3) S E[max U ] ln exp(u / ) 

     
  Unobserved heterogeneity in preferences is represented by a single constant μ2. 
The more uncertain the preferences are, the larger this constant is. SH can also be 
interpreted as the expected indirect utility function associated with the n (regular) 
alternatives 
The probability of choosing hiH hours, conditional on the honest strategy, is given 
by 
 
  iH iH kH k1 , 2 , , , n (4) P(h |H) P(U max U )   .  
With i being extreme value IID distributed it is well known that this optimal 
choice probability P(hiH|H) is a multinomial logit. This multinomial logit can be derived 
from taking the derivatives of the consumer surplus SH with respect to the deterministic 
part of the utility function (see Anderson et al (1992), chapter 2, for this and other aspects 







Se x p ( u / )
(5) P(h |H) ;i 1 ,2,,,n







We note that in (5) 2 appears only as a scaling coefficient of the deterministic part of the 
utility function. It will be absorbed in the parameters that are present in the deterministic 
part of the utility function. Hence, 2 is not identified from data.    
 
Stage 2. Given a tax evading strategy 
 m:\o\Frisch Sd\RDU, evasion, FA rev2   11 
In order to derive the probabilities for hours supplied when a tax evading strategy is 
chosen we need some new notation. 
Let 
CijE,T = after tax and penalty income when the individual is a tax evader and works hij= 
hiH+hjE annual hours, where hiH is hours worked in the regular economy and hjE is hours 
worked in the irregular economy. The subscript T indicates that the individual’s tax 
evasion is detected and he or she has to pay a fine.  The indices i= 1,2,,,n and j=1,2,,,n 
index hours of work alternatives in the regular and irregular economy, respectively. 
CijE,NT= as above, but now tax evasion is not detected. 
WE= hourly wage rate in the black economy 
RjE= WEhjE 
 
= the fine that the evader has to pay if detected. 
 
 Then 
ij,E,T iH jE iH jE jE ( 6 ) C RRI T ( RR , I ) ( R ) ; i , j 1 , 2 , , , n        
 
ij,E,NT iH jE iH (7) C R R I T(R ,I);i,j 1,2,,,n     
 
Let q denote the probability of detection (1q0) and let f(q) be a probability weighting 
function. As mentioned above this probability weighting function may allow for the 
possibility that individuals give overweight to small probabilities related to undesirable 
events. The specification used her implies a rank-dependent expected utility model, with 




                                                 
16 The functional form implies an inflection point (i.e. where q=f(q)) at q=1/2 for 0<a<1. Prelec (1998, p. 
504-506) discusse the function w(p) = exp(-(-ln p)
α) [in our notation: f(q) = exp(-(-ln q)
α] which generates 
an inflection point at p=1/e = 0.37. Although Prelec argues that empirical data supports an inflection point 
in the vicinity of 0.37, we have, because of the reasons in support for the RDEU model, chosen 
specification (8) in the present study.  m:\o\Frisch Sd\RDU, evasion, FA rev2   12 
aa 1
f(q) 1 [ 1 ( 1 q) q ];1 a 0
2
1
(8) f(q) for a 0
2
f(q) qfora 1





The weighting function, f(q), is an inverted s-shaped curve for which the coefficient a 
determines  the curvature.  When a approaches 0, the curve approaches a step function 
for which f(q) = ½ for 0 < q < 1. When a approaches 1, the weighting function 
approaches the diagonal, that is f(q)=q. 
The random utility function, given that the individual follows a tax evading 
strategy, denoted UijE, has two parts. (Remember that subscripts i and j denote the 
number of hours worked in the regular and in the irregular economy, respectively.) The 
first part is the deterministic part, which is the expected or rank dependent expected 
utility related to the lottery of taking part in tax evasion. The second part is the random 
term, random to the analyst and with the same distribution as the random term in (2). 
Thus, 
 
ijE ij,E,T iH jE ij,E,NT iH jE ij 1, 2,,,n (9) U f(q)u(C ,h h ,X) (1 f(q))u(C ,h h ,X) ;i, j           
As above, let SE be the expected value of the maximum of the expected random 
utility, that is 
 
ijE ijE,T iH jE ijE,NT iH jE
nn
E 22 i 1,2,,n;j 1,2,,n ijE krE
k1r1
where now
(11) u f(q)u(C ,h h ,X) (1 f(q))u(C ,h h ,X)
(10) S E[max U ] ln exp(u / ) 

   
   
  
 
The probability of working hiH in the regular economy and hiE in the irregular economy, 
conditional on being a tax evader, is then given by: 








exp(u / ) S
(12) P(h h |E) ;i,j 1,2,,,n







Stage 1. Choice of strategy, honest (H) or tax evader (E) 
 
To select strategy in this first stage, the individual compares SH and SE. Because our 
model is a random utility model we have to derive the probabilities of the two strategies. 
As outlined in Ben Akiva (1973), Ben-Akiva and Lerman (1979,1985) the probability of 
choosing an optimal strategy can be evaluated by the expected indirect utility functions 
SH and SE. 
  Moreover, we assume that the agent, when deciding on evading taxes or not, pay 
attention to how socially acceptable the illegal act of evading tax is in society. To 
represent this in the model we will employ the individuals’ perception of this issue as 
reported in our survey data. It is important to note that we do not introduce the norm 
variable as the only explanatory variable. We will also assume that the opportunity to 
evade taxes vary across different types of occupation. In principle we should have 
modeled the agents’ choice of education and choice of sector in the regular economy, 
together with labor supply and tax evasion, but to do so would have required data beyond 
what we have access to. The justification for our approach is that the opportunity to evade 
taxes differs across occupations. For workers say, in the construction sector it is easier 
not to declare all income to the tax authorities than for those who work in the government 
sector. To reflect these possible differences in tax evasion opportunities we have 
introduced two dummy variables, one for those working in the construction sector and 
one for those working in the government sector.  
Our motivation for doing this is that we have the hypothesis that social norms and 
the work place of the individuals affect the individual’s propensity and possibility to 
evade taxes in addition to economic incentives like taxes and wages. 
Let z be a vector of variables that includes perception of how socially acceptable 
tax evasion is and industry in which the individual works. Let g(z) denote a function that 
will be used to weight the expected indirect utility of tax evasion. Note that there are m:\o\Frisch Sd\RDU, evasion, FA rev2   14 
three variables in the z- vector and hence in the g-function. The empirical specification of 
the g-function is given below. For more details about weighting choice probabilities with 
opportunity densities we refer to Creedy and Kalb (2005) and Dagsvik and Strøm (2006).  
Let P(H) denote the probability of pursuing an honest strategy. The probability of 






exp(S / ) P(H)





where 1 is a positive constant. The g-function is attached to the part in the probability 
which contains the expected indirect utility that follows from the alternatives when the 
individual is a tax evader. It captures how norms and occupation may affect the choice 
probabilities of strategies (evasion or not). Following Dagsvik and Strøm (2006) we call 
this g-function the norm and opportunity density and it follows from eq. (13) that it can 
be interpreted as weighting the value of the tax evasion strategy in the choice probability.  
 
The unconditional probabilities 
 
The unconditional probabilities, which relates to the event that we observe, are denoted 
P(hiH,H) and P(hiH,hjE,E) and are given by 
 
iH iH
iH jE iH jE
(14) P(h ,H) P(h |H)P(H)
and





When 2/ 1= 1, the nested multinomial logit model (the two stage model outlined above) 
degenerates to a multinomial logit model, or  
 










(16) P(h , H)
exp(u / ) g(z) exp(u / )
and
g(z)exp(u / )
(17) P(h , h , E)














The likelihood expression 
 
Let NH be the group of individuals in the sample who are observed to follow an honest 
strategy (they answer no to the question in the questionnaire of whether they have evaded 
taxes the last twelve months) and let NE be the group of tax evaders in the sample. Let 
subscript s indicate an individual. The joint a priori probability of what we observe is 
then given by the likelihood L: 
 
HE
s iH s iH jE
sN sN
( 18) L P(h ,H) P(h ,h ,E)

    
 





Let v(C,h,X)=u(C,h,X)/2. This deterministic part of the utility function is assumed to be 
a Box-Cox transformation of disposable income and leisure. A justification for this 
functional form is given in Dagsvik and Strøm (2006). 
 
00 1 1 2 2
(C/100000) 1 (8760 h) 1
(19) v(C, h, X) ( ) ( X X )
  
     

, 
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where C is disposable household income. X1 is age (in years) and X2 is dummy, which 
equals 1 if the individual is a woman and zero otherwise.  The coefficient  2  is absorbed 
in  0012 ,,,  . The reason for hours of work in the utility function is that annual 
leisure in hours, defined as 8760-h, is assumed to have an impact on individual welfare.  
In measuring C all details of the step-wise tax-functions are accounted for, see 
Appendix 2. The fine, if tax evasion is detected, is based on the perceived fines as 
reported by the respondents. The probability of detection, q, is also based on the 
individual’s perception of detection probabilities as reported by the respondents. The 
wage rate used to calculate gross earnings equals the ordinary hourly wage rate reported 
by the respondent in the questionnaire. The same wage rate is used in the regular as well 
in the irregular economy. It is likely that the wage rate in the irregular part of the 
economy is less than the wage rate in the regular part, but we do not observe by how 
much for all participants in the sample. The model requires that all individuals know their 
potential wage rate in the irregular part of the economy, also those who did not 
participate. This is a consequence of assuming utility maximizing individuals who 
compare utilities in order to make their decisions. If we had estimated wage equations for 
working in the irregular economy, given the survey data, it might have introduced more 
biases in the model than simply using the reported wage in the regular part of the 
economy. One would also expect that individual wages in the regular and the irregular 
economy are strongly correlated.  
Hours worked in the regular economy are observed in broad categories and we 
have used the midpoints (10, 25, 37.5, 50) per week and with 50 hours a week as a 
maximum. Hours worked in the irregular economy are reported as annual hours, and 
again in broad categories with midpoints (10, 25, 37, 75, 150, 250, 600) and with 600 as a 
maximum. In the data set none are observed with zero hours in the regular economy. 
Hence, we are not taking into account the decision not to participate in the regular labor 
market. If this should have been done, we would have needed information about non-
working individuals. However, our sample is rather representative for the Norwegian 
labor market. Unemployment rates are low by international standards and the 
participation rate among married women is the highest in the world. If we had included 
the option of not working in the regular economy, without observing anyone doing so, m:\o\Frisch Sd\RDU, evasion, FA rev2   17 
there is a risk that we would have included some unobserved elements that could have 
biased our estimates.  Of course, zero hours in the irregular labor market is an option in 
the model. 
Feasible hours deviate somewhat from the model, the main difference being that 
they differ between the regular and the irregular part of economy. This way of treating 
feasible hours reflects that working in the irregular economy has the character of being 
side jobs.   




The variables appearing in the z-vector are:  
z1 equals 1 if the respondent answers that he or she thinks that people in general accept 
tax evasion, and it equals zero otherwise, answer to Question 16 in the questionnaire, see 
Appendix 1. 
z2 equals 1 if the respondent works in the construction sector, otherwise equals zero,  
z3 equals 1 if the respondent works in the government sector, otherwise zero.  
Our hypotheses are that  1 z may have a positive impact on the probability of being a 
tax evader. Moreover, we expect that  2 z may also have a positive impact on the 
probability. The reasons why individuals working in the construction sector may have a 
higher probability of being tax evader are in the first place that they have the skills that 
often are demanded by households when repairing and building houses, and in the second 
place this sector is typically organized with many small and also irregular firms. Finally, 
we expect that  3 z may have a negative impact on the probability of being a tax evader. In 
the first place individuals working in the public sector have qualifications that are not in 
so high demand when it comes to do what irregular workers normally do. In the second 
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3. Data 
 
The data we have used are taken from a survey done by a private Norwegian polling 
institute MMI in October 2003. The recruiting of participants was done by MMI over the 
telephone, asking the person in the household, above 15 years of age and who most 
recently celebrated his or her birthday, if he/she wanted to participate in a research study. 
The recruitment was conducted randomly in the Norwegian population. The individuals 
who said yes to participate got a questionnaire in anonymous envelopes and were asked 
to return them by mail. There was no possibility to link the telephone numbers to the 
returned envelops. Thus anonymity was ensured. Still it could be the case that the 
respondents underreport their tax evasion activities. 
The answer percentage is fairly high, see Table 1 below. 86% said yes to receive a 
questionnaire in mail, and 73% of these individuals filled out the questionnaire and 
mailed it back, which implies that 63% (=0.86x0.73x100) of the persons initially 
contacted ended up participating in the survey. This is a very good response compared to 
response rates in other surveys, for instance in the consumer expenditure surveys of 
Statistics Norway. 
 
Table 1. Response rates in the 
surveys. Norway. 2003. 
 
Asked to participate, 
Number of individuals 
1742 
Agreed to participate,%  86 
Of which answered,%  72 
Returned the 
questionnaire, percentage 
of asked, % 
63 
 
A relevant question regarding the results is the one of possible systematic bias. A 
common experience with surveys is that people agreeing to participate might have better 
knowledge of and a higher interest in the subject in questions than the people refusing to 
participate. The participants might also have “an agenda” when answering. However, the 
2-staged process of recruiting and filling out of questionnaires allows for some control of 
the possible bias, see Andresen et al (2005) for more details. In addition to drawing the m:\o\Frisch Sd\RDU, evasion, FA rev2   19 
recruiting areas randomly the results have afterwards been weighted as if everyone 
agreed to participate and filled out the questionnaire. 
  The survey contains information regarding relevant personal characteristics of the 
respondents, such as age and employment, economic variables such as income and taxes, 
and people’s engagement in as well as attitudes towards non-reported income activities. 
The questions asked in the survey are presented in Appendix 1 as well as summary 
statistics. We note that 11.2 percent of the sample is tax evaders. The evaders work 
slightly more also in the regular economy than the non-evaders and pay also slightly 
more in taxes. The evaders are more inclined to think that evasion is socially acceptable, 
but it is interesting to note that a majority of the non-evaders also is of the same opinion. 
The evaders’ perceptions of fines and detection probabilities are slightly below those of 
the non-evaders. The survey question that we employ in measuring participation in tax 
evasion activities is Question no 22: “During the last 12 months, have you received 
compensation for work that has not been reported or will not be reported to the tax 
authorities?” Alternatively the answer to question 17 could have been used: “Have you 
ever been engaged in non-reported income activities?” Given yes to Q22, the correlation 
between the two answers are 100%. If Q17 had been used the participation rate had been 
slightly higher, between 12 and 13 %. The reason for using the answer to Q22 is that this 




4. Estimates and predictions 
 
The maximum likelihood estimates of the deterministic part of the utility function, and of 
the norm and opportunity density, are presented in Table 2. Note that the dependent 
variable is two dummies, whether to evade taxes or not (Stage 1 above) and hours of 
work (Stage 2). Because the utility function is random, the model is expressed in ex-ante 
choice probabilities of these variables and they enter the likelihood function in equation 
(18) above. In the table “Consumption” is disposable income in the different states as 
explained in equations (1), (6) and (7). “Leisure x age” is the interaction of log leisure m:\o\Frisch Sd\RDU, evasion, FA rev2   20 
and age and “Leisure x female” is the interaction between log leisure and a dummy equal 
to1 if the respondent is a woman.  
   It turned out that the best fit was with the deterministic part being a log-linear 
function of leisure, rather than a Box-Cox transformation of leisure. Note that when the 
exponent in the Box-Cox transformation of leisure goes to zero the functional form 
becomes log-linear in leisure. In the estimation 2/ 1 was not significantly different from 
1. We have thus estimated a multinomia1 logit model. 
 The estimates show that the marginal utility of disposable income is positive, but 
declining (<1). Marginal utility of leisure (or rather of not working outside home) is 
higher among women than among men, which cet.par. reduce the incentives among 
women to do illicit work. 
The graph of the estimated weighting function, 
0.3567 0.3567 1
() 1 ( 1 ( 1 ) )
2
fq q q       
is  presented in Figure 1.  
 
 










Figure 1.The estimated weighting function m:\o\Frisch Sd\RDU, evasion, FA rev2   21 
 
Our hypothesis that the agents are overweighting detection probabilities is 
corroborated. Whereas the summary statistics show that the perceived detection 
probability is 0.10 for non-evaders and 0.07 for evaders, the estimate (a=0.3567) implies 
an average of the weighted probability of about 0.23. If the objective probability of being 
caught is about the same as in other countries (cf footnote 5 above), say 0.03, the 
perceived detection probability turns out to be about three times as high. With these 
estimates the puzzle of over-compliance is not that much of a puzzle. From Table 2 we 
note that the coefficient a is at the border of not being significant different from 0, which 
means that the perceived detection probabilities are not significant different from 0.5. The 
latter means that the individuals toss a coin when calculating the chances of being 
detected, which of course is a very high overweighting of detection probabilities. The 
expected utility model, EU, is a special case of our model. This occurs when a=1, which 
implies that f(q)=q, see equation (8). Thus, the EU model is strongly rejected. 
The estimate of g1 indicates that the more the agents think that tax evasion is 
accepted in the society, the more they evade. To work in the construction sector increases 
the probabilities of working in the irregular economy. 
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Table 2. Estimates of the utility function and the norm and opportunity density 




  Consumption, 
exponent 
0.7196 9.4 
0  Leisure, constant  10.5402  3.5 
1  Leisure x age  0.0261  0.5 
2  Leisure x female  3.2374  2.9 




g1 Norm  0.9709  3.3 
g2 Construction  sector  1.2029  3.2 
g3 Govt.  sector  -0.6427  -0.8 
No of observations  626 
Log-likelihood -1068.74 
McFaddens rho  0.537 
 
Goodness of fit is defined as 1 minus the log-likelihood related to the estimates, 
relative to the log-likelihood when all alternatives have an equal chance to be chosen 
(“McFaddens rho”). Here McFaddens rho equals 0.537, which means that the empirical 
model explains data 53.7% better than if all choices had been made at pure random. Thus 
the economic incentives, norms and opportunities introduced in the model matter for the 
decisions made by the respondents. 
 In order to explain further how the model fits data we have predicted how well it 
predicts hours of work and tax revenues. This is an important test on the model since the 
main outcome of the model is labor supply. To predict labor supply outcomes and taxes 
paid we need the following new notation.  
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Here   
(LH|H):expected annual hours of work in the regular economy, given honest 
(LH|E): expected annual hours of work in the regular economy, given evader 
(LE|E): expected annual hours of work in the irregular economy, given evader 
LH: expected annual hours of work in the regular economy 
LE: expected annual hours of work in the irregular economy 
52 are the number of weeks per year. 
In addition we report the tax revenues in the different cases. TH is the expected 
amount of taxes paid by the non-evaders, while TH|E is the expected amount of taxes paid 
the evaders. T is the expected amount of taxes paid in the total population, which, of 
course, lies between the two others. 
Predictions and observed outcomes are given in Table 3. To predict the outcomes 
of the model we first predict the outcomes for each individual and then we aggregate.  
We observe that the model predicts the outcomes rather precisely. The model gives a 
rather remarkable good prediction of hours supplied in the regular part of the economy, in 
particular among the tax evaders. There is one exception: Hours worked in the irregular 
economy. A possible source of too high predictions of unregistered labor supply is that 
the observed hours of unregistered work may not be the hours supplied, since not all 
individuals are free to work unregistered as many hours as they want. For example, many 
of the respondents are employees who work in firms where it not so easy to combine 
irregular work with their main full time occupation, even if they had preferred to do so. 
Examples are individuals working in the government sector, in hospitals, in energy 
companies and supermarkets. An important aspect of structural models that deals with 
labor supply and taxation, here also with tax evaders included, is how well it predicts m:\o\Frisch Sd\RDU, evasion, FA rev2   24 
taxes paid. From Table 3 we observe that although the model predicts a somewhat lower 
amount paid by the tax evaders than observed, the prediction of taxes paid in the whole 
population is rather accurate. 
 
Table 3. Observed and predicted outcomes 
 Observered  Predicted 
Shares of non-evaders P(H)  0.88782  0.88816 
Shares of evaders, P(E)  0.11218  0.11184 
Expected  annual hours in the 
regular economy, given honest 
(LH|H) 
1733 1880 
Expected  annual hours in the 
regular economy, given dishonest 
(LH|E) 
1768 1730 
Expected  annual hours in the 
irregular economy, given 
dishonest (LE|E) 
79 300 
Expected  annual hours in the 
regular economy LH 
1736 1865 
Expected  annual hours in the 
irregular economy LE 
9 34 
Annual taxes paid, given honest, 
TH, NOK
* 
82 750  86 839 
Annual taxes paid , given 
dishonest, TH|E, NOK 
83 041  75 403 
Annual taxes paid, T, NOK  82 782  85 642 
*Sept 20, 2010, 1 Euro=7.9 NOK 
 
5. Labor supply elasticities 
 
In Table 4 we report the elasticity of labor supply aggregates (or weighted individual 
elasticities) with respect to wages rates. In the model feasible hours of work are 7 m:\o\Frisch Sd\RDU, evasion, FA rev2   25 
alternative hours per week in the regular economy and 7 alternatives per year in the 
irregular economy. Because preferences are random the choice of hours are represented 
through choice probabilities. Expected hours worked, as shown in eq. (21), is then the 
weighted sum of the feasible hours of work, weighted with the estimated probabilities. 
When wage rates change, these probabilities change. The probabilities depend on 
disposable income, as outlined in the model. This is the basis for calculating elasticities. 
The within-sector elasticities are moderate, but the between-sector elasticities are 
sizable. We observe that an overall wage increase of 1 percent will increase supply of 
regular hours by 0.23 percent and reduce the supply of irregular hours by 0.41 percent. 
Thus we should expect that the size of the shadow economy is declining when real wages 
are increasing as they normally are during economic growth periods. This also implies 
that if real wages are declining say, due to a recession, we should expect that the shadow 
economy is growing. The impact of wages on choice probabilities are in part substitution 
effects and in part income effects. 
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A labour supply model in which the individuals have the option to evade taxes by 
working in the irregular economy is estimated on Norwegian survey data from October 
2003. A growing number of studies indicate that people tend to overweigh low 
probabilities of losses. The possibility of being sanctioned for tax evasion might be an 
example of such losses, and we find that the hypothesis that people are overweighting 
subjective probabilities of being detected is corroborated. Tax payers’ belief about social 
norms also has an effect on the tax evasion decision.  
But economic incentives like wages and taxes are also found to play a role in 
explaining behaviour. The model can thus be used in policy simulations. An example is 
changes in tax rates and to find how these changes can reduce tax evasion and stimulate 
labor supply in the regular part of the economy.  
The model predicts hours worked rather precisely both among the tax evaders and 
the non-evaders. The labor supply elasticities show that an overall wage increase in the 
society may shift labor supply away from the irregular economy and towards the regular 
economy. This also means that during recessions when real wages are declining one 
should expect that tax evading activities will increase.   
 The reported participation in the shadow economy the last 12 months gives a 
participation rate of around 11%. This together with irregular work being typically side 
jobs implies that the shadow economy in percent of GDP is substantially below estimates 
reported by Schneider (2007). For 2002-2003 he estimates the size of the Norwegian 
shadow economy in percent of GDP to 18.4 percent. This is a rather high estimate and 
puts the shadow economy above the oil and gas sector in Norway that year. His estimate 
is based on macroeconomic variables and in particular on money stocks and flows. The 
estimate also includes more shadow activities than otherwise legal work. 
   Our approach is based on microdata collected in surveys and it could well be that 
our estimates of tax evading activities is somewhat on the low side, while it seems that 
Schneider’s estimates is on the high side. The purpose of our approach, however, is not to m:\o\Frisch Sd\RDU, evasion, FA rev2   27 
give a precise estimate of the shadow economy in percent of GDP, but to investigate 
labor supply behaviour when tax evasion is an option.  
It is however true that the survey data implies that tax evading activities in 
Norway are minor. Findings that support this implication is given in Andresen et al 
(2005), where it is shown that the participation rate in the shadow economy in Norway 
has declined monotonically from 20 percent in 1980 to 11 percent in 2003. There is one 
exception. In 1988-1989 Norway went through a recession with increased unemployment 
and reductions in real wages. In 1989 the participation rate in shadow activities increased.  
The reasons for the decline in shadow activities over the last 20-30 years are 
changes in the tax structure towards less progressive taxes, increase in real wages and 
income, more regular jobs and a substantial increase in the number of people working in 
the public sector. Moreover, since 1980 female participation in regular jobs outside home 
has increased to an extent that Norway now is number 1 in the world with respect to 
female labor market participation.  Contini (1981) mentions higher female labor market 
participation as an important reason for less participation in the shadow economy among 
women.  
These reasons for the gradually decline in tax evading activities over the last 20-
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Appendix 1. The questionnaire. 
 
Questions asked in the questionnaire 
 
The respondents were asked to cross out answer-alternatives that vary across the 




Q.3. Number of children living in the house 
Q.4. Marital status 
Q.5. Does your spouse have income generating work, and if so, how many hours? 
Q.6. Education in years 
Q.7. Occupational status (wage worker, self-employed, unemployed, retired, etc) 
Q.8. Hours of work last week in the regular economy 
Q.9. Hourly wage rate in main occupation 
Q.10. Annual, net income (after tax) in main occupation 
Q.11. Annual gross income in main occupation 
Q.12 Occupation by industry 
Q.13. Do you receive other income than wage income such as social security 
benefits/unemployment benefits/capital income? 
Q.14.What is your tax rate for overtime work, the marginal tax rate in percent? 
Q.15 How much tax do you pay in percent of your total annual gross income? 
Q.16.What do you think is the attitude among people with respect to receive payment 
for work that is not reported to the tax authorities? Do you think it is 
accepted/accepted to some extent/not accepted/don’t know 
Q.17. Have you ever been engaged in non-reported income activities? 
Q.18. If so, what kind of activities was it? 
Q.19. If you had the opportunity to receive income without having to report it to the 
tax authorities, would you then accepted such income? 
Q.20. If you don’t report income to the tax authorities, how large do you think the m:\o\Frisch Sd\RDU, evasion, FA rev2   35 
chance (percent) is that you would be caught? 
Q.21. If you do not report income to the tax authorities, say NOK 20 000, and you are 
caught; you have to pay a penalty tax in addition to the regular tax on the nonreported 
income. How large do you think this penalty tax rate is (percent)? 
Q.22. During the last 12 months, have you received compensation for work that has 
not been reported or will not be reported to the tax authorities? 
Q.23. Approximately how many hours of non-reported work have you done during 
the last 12 months? 
Q.24. At the last tax declaration; what was the total annual income from work and 
capital income that you did not report? m:\o\Frisch Sd\RDU, evasion, FA rev2   36 
 
 
Table A, 1. Summary statistics: The whole sample, Norway 2003 
Number of observations  626 
Number of non-evaders 
Number of evaders 
556 
70 
Share of women in the sample, percent  52 
Percentage that thinks that tax evasion is socially 
acceptable 
53 
 Average  StD  Min  Max 
Age, years  41   10  20   60  
Hourly wage, NOK*  151  38  85   230 
Gross annual wage 
income, NOK 
294 581  119 268   48 100  598 000  
Hours per week 
worked in the 
regular economy 
37   10  10  50 
Annual tax paid, 
NOK 
82 782  53 069   5 694   231 146  
Perceived fine, 
percent 
19.5 13.6  0.7  37   
Perceived detection 
probability 
0.10 0.06  0.025  0.25 
* September 20: 1Euro=NOK 7.9 m:\o\Frisch Sd\RDU, evasion, FA rev2   37 
 






Weekly hours in the regular economy 
Hourly wage, NOK 
Gross wage income, NOK 
Annual tax, NOK 
36 
151 
293 162  
82 750  
Perceived fine, percent 
Perceived detection probability 
19.6 
0.10 










Weekly hours in the regular economy 
Annual hours in the irregular economy 
Hourly wage, NOK 
Annual gross income from regular and 
irregular work, NOK 







Perceived fine, percent 
Perceived detection probability 
18.6 
0.07 
Percentage that thinks that tax evasion is 
socially acceptable 
74 
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